Thus, from Mills` perspective, racism is not just an unfortunate coincidence of Western democratic and political ideals. It is not that we have a political system that has been perfectly designed and, unfortunately, applied imperfectly. One of the reasons we continue to think that the problem of race in the West is relatively superficial, that it does not go all the way, is the impact that the idealized social contract has on our imagination. According to Mills, we continue to believe the myths that social contract theory tells us – that everyone is equal, that everyone is treated equally before the law, that the Founding Fathers were committed to equality and freedom for all, and so on. Thus, one of the real goals of social contract theory is to hide the true political reality from the eyes – some people are granted the rights and freedoms of complete people, and others are treated as sub-persons. The racial treaty shapes the structure of our political systems and lays the foundation for the continued racial oppression of non-whites. So we cannot respond by simply including more non-whites in the mix of our political institutions, our representation, etc. Rather, we need to review our policy in general from the point of view of the racial treaty and start from where we are, in full knowledge of how our society has been informed by the systematic exclusion of some people from the realm of politics and the treaty. This “naturalized” feature of the racial contract, meaning it tells a story about who we really are and what is contained in our history, is better, according to Mills, because it contains the promise of one day allowing us to truly live up to the norms and values that are at the heart of Western political traditions. These two principles are linked by a certain order.
The first principle, to distribute civil liberties as much as possible with respect for equality, precedes the second principle, which distributes social and economic goods. In other words, we cannot choose to give up some of our civil liberties in favor of greater economic advantage. Rather, we must meet the requirements of the first principle before moving on to the second. From Rawls` point of view, this series of principles expresses a fundamental rational preference for certain types of goods, that is, those embodied in civil liberties, over other types of goods, that is, economic benefits. Following Pateman`s reasoning, a number of feminists have also questioned the nature of the person at the center of contract theory. The liberal individual, the entrepreneur, is represented by the Hobbesian man, the owner of Locke, Rousseau`s “Noble Savage”, the person of Rawls in the original position and Gauthier`s Robinson Crusoe. The liberal individual is supposed to be universal: without race, without gender, without class, disembodied and is understood as a representative of an abstract, generalized model of humanity that is capitalized. However, many philosophers have argued that if we take a closer look at the characteristics of the liberal individual, we do not find a representation of universal humanity, but a specific type of historically located person. It .B Macpherson, for example, argued that hobbesian man, in particular, is a bourgeois man, with the qualities we would expect from a person during the emerging capitalism that characterized modern Europe. Feminists have also argued that the liberal individual is a special, historical, and embodied person. (As well as race-conscious philosophers like Charles Mills, who will be discussed below.) Specifically, they argued that the person at the center of liberal theory and the social contract is gendered. Christine Di Stefano shows in her 1991 book Configurations of Masculinity that a number of historically important modern philosophers can be understood to develop their theories from the point of view of masculinity as it is conceived in modern times.
She argues that Hobbes` conception of the liberal individual, which laid the foundation for the dominant modern notion of the person, is particularly masculine, as it is understood as atomistic and solitary, and owes none of its qualities or even its existence to any other person, especially to its mother. Hobbes` man is thus radically individual, in a way that is specifically due to the character of modern masculinity. Virginia Held argues in her 1993 book Feminist Morality that social contract theory is implicitly based on an idea of the person that can be described as an “economic person.” The “businessman” is primarily concerned with maximizing his own individual interests, and he enters into contracts to achieve this goal. However, the “economic man” does not represent all people at all times and in all places. In particular, it does not adequately represent children and those who provide them with the care they need, who have been women in the past. The model of the “economic man” cannot therefore rightly claim to be a general representation of all people. Similarly, Annette Baier argues that Gauthier`s concept that the liberal individual enters into the social contract to maximize his or her own individual interests is gender-specific in that it does not take seriously the position of the children or women who are usually responsible for caring for those children. In Plato`s best-known dialogue, the Republic, the theory of social contracts is again defended, albeit less favorably this time. In Book II, Glaucon proposes a candidate for an answer to the question “What is justice?” by presenting a declaration of social contract for the essence of justice. What men want most is to be able to commit injustices against others without fear of reprisals, and what they most want to avoid is to be treated unfairly by others without being able to do injustice in return. Justice is, therefore, he says, the conventional result of the laws and alliances that people make to avoid these extremes.
Unable to commit wrongs with impunity (like those who wear the Gyges ring) and fearful of becoming victims themselves, the men decide that it is in their interest to submit to the Convention of Justice. Socrates rejects this view, and most of the rest of the dialogue focuses on showing that justice is worth doing for itself, and that the righteous man is the happy man. Thus, from Socrates` point of view, justice has a value that far exceeds the regulatory value that Glaucon attaches to it. Mills` central argument is that there is a “racial contract” that is even more fundamental to Western society than the social contract. This racial contract primarily determines who is considered a legal and political person in its own right, and thus defines the parameters of who can “unite” with the freedom and equality promised by the social contract. Some people, especially white men, are individuals in their own right according to the racial contract. As such, they have the right to conclude the statutes and certain legal contracts. They are considered fully human and therefore deserve equality and freedom. Their status as full-fledged persons gives them greater social power. In particular, it gives them the power to enter into contracts to be the subject of the contract, while other persons are denied such a privilege and are relegated to the status of contractual objects. Carole Pateman`s 1988 book, The Sexual Contract, argues that beneath the myth of the idealized contract, as described by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, lies a more fundamental contract on male-female relationships.
Contract theory presents itself as an opponent of patriarchy and patriarchal law. (Locke`s social contract, for example, contrasts sharply with the work of Robert Filmer, who championed patriarchal power.) But the “original pact” (2), which precedes the social contract concluded by equals, is the consent of men to dominate and control women. This “original pact” is made by brothers, literally or metaphorically, who, after overthrowing the father`s rule, then agree to share their domination over women who were previously under the exclusive control of a man, the father. The shift from “classical patriarchy” (24) to modern patriarchy is therefore a change in the question of who has power over women. However, this is not a fundamental change in whether women are dominated by men. The balance of power between men is changing, but the relationship of women to the power of men does not change. Modern patriarchy is characterized by a contractual relationship between men, and part of this contract involves power over women. This fact that one form of patriarchy was not completely overthrown, but replaced by another form in which male power was distributed to more men rather than held by a single man, is illustrated by Freud`s story of the emergence of civilization. According to this story, a group of brothers led by a father who has maintained exclusive sexual access to the women of the tribe kills the father and then contracts with each other to be equal and share the women.
It is history, whether or not we understand Freud`s history as historically correct, of modern patriarchy and its deep dependence on contract as the means by which men control and dominate women. Rousseau has two different theories of the social contract. The first is found in his essay Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, commonly known as Second Discourse, and is a report on the moral and political development of man over time, from a state of nature to modern society. .